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ARGUMENT
POINT I.

a.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING
THAT THE MATEUSES OWED NO DUTY TO MRS.
JACKSON BY IMPROPERLY FOCUSING SOLELY
ON WHETHER THE CAT HAD BITTEN ANYONE
BEFORE.

Under Utah law, the Mateuses owed a duty to Mrs. Jackson to
prevent the cat attack.

The Mateuses incorrectly argue that solely because they claim to have no
knowledge of their cat biting another person prior to the attack inflicted on Mrs. Jackson,
that they had no duty to Mrs. Jackson. The district court similarly erred in so ruling. This
Court has ruled that whether a duty exists depends on several factors, of which
foreseeability is only one element.1 AMS Salt Indus, v. Magnesium Corp., 942 P.2d 315,
321 (Utah 1997). The other elements that must be taken into account in determining
whether the Mateuses owed a duty to Mrs. Jackson include: 1) the likelihood of the
injury, 2) the magnitude of the burden of guarding against it, 3) the consequences of
placing that burden upon defendant, 4) voluntary conduct which increases the risk of
harm, and 5) general policy considerations. Id. (citations omitted.) Each of these

1

In AMS Salt Indus.. 942 P.2d at 32 L Justice Russon wrote that w'[s]everal
other factors may be relevant in ascertaining whether there is a duty.... foreseeability can
be one of those factors. It is not, however, the only factor."
1

applicable elements argues in favor of imposing a duty on the Mateuses requiring them to
control their cat and holding them liable for their failure to do so.
/.

The likelihood of injury.

In this case, there was only one piece of evidence before the district court
regarding the likelihood of cats to attack and injure human beings. That evidence came in
the form of deposition testimony from a medical professional, Dr. Eric Vanderhoof, who
has experience treating cat bites:
Q.
A.

Just curious. This is my first case I've dealt with a cat bite.
They're not uncommon. Cat bites are pretty virulent.
Human bites and cat bites are pretty bad. The problem with
cat bites is that they have such sharp little teeth that when they
bite, the bacteria — because their mouths are filthy - gets
lodged inside there and has no way to get out. When you
have a dog bite you sort of lay the thing open and you have a
big open wound. That way the pus can't stay trapped and it
can get out. If you're not draining pus from your body,
oftentimes that's not a big problem. But when it gets trapped
underneath, that's when you get into trouble. So cat bites tend
to be more problematic than a lot of animal bites.

(R. 166.)
The evidence from Dr. Vanderhoof is that cat bites are common, or, in other
words, that the likelihood of a cat biting someone is high. The defendants have presented
only unsupported argument in their brief asserting that tabby cats are not prone to have
vicious tendencies, or that cats do not harm humans. Those assertions are not only
unsupported, but are refuted by the evidence of record. The evidence in this case shows
2

that cat bites are common and dangerous to humans. Therefore, the unrefuted evidence in
this case shows that there is a likelihood of injury if a cat is not controlled by its owner.
//.

The magnitude of guarding against cat bites.

The magnitude of guarding against cat bites by an owner is minimal, and by the
same token, if cat bites are guarded against, innocent persons will be saved a great deal of
pain and suffering as well a potentially devastating financial consequences. Contrary to
the Mateuses' unsupported assertions, reasonable cat owners do not simply allow their
animals out of their control. Mrs. Jackson owns four cats that are kept inside her house
where they can be properly controlled and where the Jacksons can ensure that the animals
do not come into contact with other persons and other animals in an uncontrolled or
unsupervised situation.
The burden to a cat owner of guarding against cat bites is slight. With animal
ownership comes a level of responsibility to control the animal and protect others from
that animal. However, the Mateuses decline to accept any responsibility to control their
animal and, in fact, argue that it is impossible for a cat owner to control the animal. The
Mateuses argue that everyone around them, other than themselves, must accept the
responsibility for dealing with their animals, and the injuries they inflict, because they are
unwilling to do so.

3

However, the Mateuses' argument contravenes the most basic principles of tort
law. The Mateuses created the potentially injurious condition by acquiring the animal.
They, as the animal's owners, are in a position to best control the animal and prevent it
from harming or coming into contact with other persons. They are also best able to train
the animal so as to prevent it from becoming aggressive. However, the Mateuses now
deny any responsibility to control their animal or prevent it from harming others.
Because the Mateuses did not take any steps to control their animal they can and should
be held liable for failure to do so.
Hi.

The consequence of imposing a burden of controlling an animal will
result in less animal bites and will place liability on the persons most
able to prevent animal attacks.

The Mateuses do not discuss the consequences that would follow should this Court
impose a duty on animal owners to control their pets. If animal owners are required to
control their pets and are held liable when their pet attacks another person and causes
injury, animal owners will be more likely to control their animals and take steps to
prevent attacks. The rule advocated by the Mateuses seeks to maintain the status quo in
an environment where cat bites are common and where those injured by cat bites are
required to bear the potentially devastating financial and physical burden of the animal
attacks. The position asserted by the Mateuses is unjust.

4

The Mateuses argue that, if controlled or supervised properly by their owners, cats'
effectiveness as mousers may become diminished. The Mateuses presented only
unsupported evidence to the district court in their summary judgment motion and on
appeal that controlling cats will diminish their effectiveness as mousers. In this modern
age, it is speculative, at best, to argue that cats are even used primarily as mousers. With
the advent of traps, poisons and exterminators it may be that most cat owners do not rely
on their animals to control the rodent population. Moreover, there is no evidence that the
Mateuses allowed their animal to roam about their neighborhood uncontrolled so that it
could act as a mouser. Therefore, the Mateuses' argument should be rejected.
Mrs. Jackson argues that cat owners must be required to control their animals in
order to prevent attacks and damages such as she has had to endure. In complete
disregard for the extreme injuries and damages which their animal has inflicted in Mrs.
Jackson, the Mateuses argue that cats must be left alone and allowed to wander around in
order to kill rodents. However, without evidence of any rodent problem in the Salt Lake
Valley, considerations involving human safety and prevention of animal attacks must take
precedence over the Mateuses' unwillingness to control or supervise their animals, even if
it is disguised under the pretense of letting their cat roam about for the public good.
The Court is being asked to determine which of the parties' considerations should
be given more weight. Certainly, matters regarding human safety and prevention of

5

injuries by animals should be given great weight by the Court.2 Cat's alleged duties as
mousers must be given much less weight in comparison to the value of human safety and
welfare.
iv.

Voluntary conduct which increases the risk of harm.

The Mateuses mistakenly assume that this category addresses Mrs. Jackson's
actions of outstretching her hand to their cat. (See, p. 9 of Appellees' Brief, wiBy
voluntarily outstretching her arm to any animal, including a cat, plaintiff increased the
risk of harm to her....") However, it is clear from the context which this category is used
in AMS Salt Indus., 942 P.2d at 320, that it refers only to the tortfeasor's voluntary
actions which may act to create a duty to another, and not to the voluntary actions of the
injured claimant. This category is inapplicable to the facts of this case. Mateuses did not
perform some voluntary conduct which increased the risk of harm to Mrs. Jackson. The
Mateuses had a legal duty to control their cat and the exercise of that control was not a

2

See e ^ , Bunnell v. Railway Co., 44 P. 927, 930 (Utah 1896), where the
plaintiff had turned his cattle upon the highway in the vicinity of a railway track, unattended,
and one of them was killed by a passing train, and this Court said: "A proper regard for the
safety of humanity and of property forbids that a person, should turn his beasts, which can
neither reason nor appreciate danger, out upon the highway, without a keeper, in the vicinity
of a railway crossing; and especially is this true where such person knows that they must
cross the track to get to the pasture where their instinct leads them. The sacredness of
human life, and common sense, alike dictate this rule." (Emphasis added.)

6

voluntary act that the Mateuses could ignore without legal consequences. Therefore, this
issue is addressed only to clarify what appears to be a misapplication of the category by
the Mateuses.
v.

General Policy Considerations.

The Mateuses5 policy argument that cats must be left alone to roam at large for the
benefit of society is without merit. There is no evidence in this case that leaving cats
alone to roam about would benefit society in general. Utah statutory law and ordinances
cited by Mrs. Jackson reveals a contrary policy of restraining animals and prohibiting
them from inflicting injury and damages upon others.3 Moreover, as stated above safety
and human welfare must take priority over a cat owners" alleged need to allow their cat to
wander about unrestrained.
b.

Under the standards set out in Pullan v. Steinmetz, the cat bite
was foreseeable even though the cat had not bitten anyone
previously.

It was erroneous for the district court to accept the Mateuses argument that
because the cat allegedly had not bitten anyone before it attacked Mrs. Jackson, that an
attack was unforeseeable. This fact is revealed by the warning contained in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518, comment h, which provides as follows:

See, fn. 2, supra.
7

Animals dangerous under particular circumstances. One who keeps a
domestic animal that possesses only those dangerous propensities that are
normal to its class is required to know its normal habits and tendencies. He
is therefore required to realize that even ordinarily gentle animals are
likely to be dangerous under particular circumstances and to exercise
reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm. . ..
This Court made it clear, in Pullan v. Steinmetz, 2000 UT 103, 16 P.3d 1245, that
foreseeability of an animal attack does not depend on whether the animal has attacked a
person on a prior occasion (although if there were a prior attack, that would impact the
issue of whether another attack was foreseeable). The Court addressed whether the
horse's bite was foreseeable in Pullan, and stated in its opinion as follows:
Plaintiff does not contend that either defendant had any knowledge
that she or other children from families that did not belong to the
Association were entering the stables and feeding the horses without
permission. Without knowing that or having reason to know that, a
jury could not find defendants negligent. According to Rachel, Steinmetz
had allowed her to ride Rocky on two occasions and had seen her feed
Rocky, although it is not clear whether Rachel was feeding him out of her
hands on those occasions. Steinmetz raised no objection to Rachel's feeding
Rocky nor warned her of any danger. However, Rachel's family was a
member of the Association, and Rachel had a right to frequent the stables.
But, there is no evidence that Steinmetz knew that plaintiff or any other
child whose family did not belong to the Association was accompanying
Rachel to the stables and hand feeding the horses without permission
or supervision. Simply maintaining a horse in a stable in a residential
subdivision without any knowledge or any reason to know that a child
from outside the Association was frequenting the stables and hand
feeding the horses without permission or supervision is an insufficient
basis on which to predicate negligence on the part of either defendant

8
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whether the cat attack was foreseeable involves a question of fact4 that could not have
been properly resolved with a summary judgment motion, but should have been left for a
jury to resolve. Under this Court's ruling in Pullen v. Steinmetz. the district court should
not have ruled, as a matter of law, that the cat bite was unforeseeable, and the district
court's judgment should be reversed.
c.

Under Utah law as set out in Looney v. Bingham Dairy, or the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518, the Mateuses owed and
breached their duty to Mrs. Jackson.

Under both Utah law and the law set out in section 518 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, the Mateuses should be held liable for failing to control their cat and
for failing to prevent their cat's attack on Mrs. Jackson. Since the facts show that cat
bites are not uncommon, a cat owner should know that they should take steps to prevent
their animals from coming into contact with strangers in uncontrolled situations, and the
Mateuses' argument that only speculation could lead them to believe that their cat could
harm another fails to recognize the realities of animal ownership, and once again displays
their uncaring attitude about the damages their animal has caused.

"The care to be exercised in any particular case depends upon the
circumstances of that case and on the extent of foreseeable danger involved and must be
determined as a question of fact." DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co.. 663 P.2d 433. 435 (Utah
1983)(Emphasis added). See also Eaton v. Savage. 502 P.2d 564 (Utah 1972); Wheeler v.
Jones. 431 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1967).

10

\ u^r hoonev v. Bingham Diary, 260 P.2d 855, 857 (Utah 1927), the Utah
S''!••'-•*••:-

.

animal's owner kn^

*.:.a \....;•:; - an a n i m a l attack did n o t h a v e to p r o v e that a n

"

-^ -

attacks when the animal was not

"rightly at the place where the injury occurred." This wise presents ;

i:

. I

where the Mateuses' cat was not rightly at the place where the in jury occurred

1 1 le •

... .n.^cs argue, perhaps disingenuously, that the cat was "in a typical place"' while the
facts show lli.il II

il 'M.i.it

Ii , l*u'k son s second story patio. Essentially, the

Mateuses argue that their cat had •-

t

• -•

; property than did the

Jacksons. Their argument cannot be accepted. The attac^ ^

on I I ^ f K U m i' .

property, on her second story porch, right outside her living room sliding-glass door.
Mrs heksoii .
would not have can

„ va. e;;; - because she mistook it for her own, cat. otherwise she
•

•

.n

«;;.*.u tiiat .:ieir cat had any right to

be on Mrs. Jackson's property. There is no c ir r.-.. •

.*•.*»

aa^-ceuto

i.n)\v the cat to come on her property.
,:e; -xcsiatement (Second) of Torts. $518. and animal .'wner may be held liable
iui harm done o- *

5

. negligent in tailing to prevent the harm. The

The Mateuses* argument mat meir cat v\u.* an unwelcome trespasser only
after it attacked Mrs. Jackson is false. The facts before the lower court were that Mrs.
Jackson mistook the Mateuses* eat for her own. and it the moment she realized that the cat
was not hers, the eat attacked '"lie Mateuses* cat was always an unwelcome trespasser<xil
the Jackson's properu.

Mateuses argue that they cannot be held liable under that negligence standard. However,
negligence cases should only rarely be resolved on summary judgment Williams v.
Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985), and then only in the most clear cut cases. It certainly
should not have been used here when the evidence is conflicting regarding the likelihood
of injury from cat bites, the impropriety of the Mateuses' allowing their cat to wonder
about without any restraint or control, and whether the injury could have been prevented
if the Mateuses had taken appropriate steps to control their cat.
POINT II:

BECAUSE CATS POSSESS PREDATORY TRAITS
SIMILAR TO THOSE POSSESSED BY DOGS, CATS
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED ONE FREE BITE
BEFORE LIABILITY IS IMPOSED ON THEIR
OWNERS.

The Court's reasons in Pullan for not extending that uDog Bite Statute" found in
Utah Code Ann. § 18-1-1, while applicable to horses, do not withstand scrutiny when
applied to other predatory animals such as cats. The Court set out its reasons for not
extending the dog bite statute to horses as follows:
We eschew the invitation to extend strict liability to owners and keepers of
horses. The legislature imposed strict liability on owners and keepers of
dogs for important reasons that would not support extending strict liability
to owners and keepers of horses. Most importantly, while dogs are capable
of injuring or killing poultry and small domestic livestock such as sheep
and goats, horses do not have that predatory trait. Additionally, when
section 18-1-1 was originally enacted in 1898, leash laws were not
common and many dogs roamed at large without restraint. Domestic
horses have not usually been allowed to roam free, but customarily have
been corralled and pastured. Section 18-1-1 and section 18-1-3, which
12

allows any person to kill a dog that is attacking, chasing, or worry ing any
domestic animal or fowl that has a commercial value, appear to have been
enacted to protect the interests of those who raise poultn and livestock.
Horses do not pose the same threat. None of ! m reason- the legislature
had for holding owners and keepers of dogs strictly liable would
support our extending strict liability to owners and keepers of horses
even when they are kept in a residential neu^K^-^^d :' - recreational
purposes.
Pullan. 1«
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This Court must redress the injustice that has been done to Mrs. Jackson, and reverse the
district court's decision.
POINT HI: THE SALT LAKE COUNTY ORDINANCES PROVIDE
EVIDENCE OF THE MATEUSES' NEGLIGENCE.
Read together and according to their plain language, Salt Lake County Ordinances,
§§ 8.04.210, 8.24.010, and 8.24.030 impose liability on the owner or keeper of an animal,
which is not properly restrained, that bites, inflicts injury, assaults, or attacks a human
being on public or private property. The Mateuses complain that these ordinances impose
strict liability on them for their cat's actions. However, that argument misses the point as
Mrs. Jackson only seeks to use the ordinances to show evidence of the Mateuses'
negligence. See, Adkins v. Uncle Bart's. Inc., 1 P.3d 528 (Utah 2000)(stating that
violation of a safety standard set by statute or ordinance constitutes prima facie evidence
of negligence.)
The Mateuses argue that the plain interpretation of the ordinances, advocated by
Mrs. Jackson, contravenes the legislative intent of the county council, but they provide no
legislative history to support their claim. The ordinances are completely in harmony with
the Dog Bite Statute and the Mateuses fail to explain how the ordinances and statute are
in disharmony. The Dog Bite Statute imposes strict liability on dog owners when their
dog injures someone, and the ordinances impose liability when other animals do the
same. Essentially, the ordinances, without affecting the dog bite statute, eliminate the one
14
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constitutional issues were appealed to this Court, and Judge Medley's order specifically
stated that no decision was rendered regarding the Mateuses" constitutional arguments.
15

foreseeable possibility that the animal can attack and injure another person. Cat owners
should be held responsible for allowing their animals to wander outside their homes
uncontrolled and unsupervised, and the burden should not be placed on innocent thirdparties to control the animals or deal with the financial consequences of an animal attack.
Justice demands that the decision granting the Mateuses' summary judgment be reversed,
and this case should be remanded for trial.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the judgment of the district court which granted
summary judgment for the Mateuses. The facts of this case show that the Mateuses were
negligent in allowing their cat to come into contract with Mrs. Jackson, and that they had
a duty to exercise reasonable care to properly control their animal. The facts show that
they breached their duty and allowed their cat to cause Mrs. Jackson's injuries.
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